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Женевська угода 1994 року. Стаття надає можливість глибше зрозуміти 
суть ядерної проблеми в Північній Кореї та дати оцінку важливості ракетно-
ядерної загрози з боку КНДР.
This article describes the Korean Peninsula denuclearization problem, which is 
a key factor in the deterioration of relations between the Northeast Asia countries. 
The article analyzes first and second nuclear crisis as well as the Geneva Agreement 
in 1994. It gives an in-depth understanding of the essence of nuclear issue in 
North Korea and helps to evaluate the importance of the nuclear missile threat 
from North Korea.
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SECuRity COOpERAtiOn
This article deals with the security cooperation in the Black Sea, in the frame-
work of the regional organization BLACKSEAFOR. The author analyzes 
the peculiarities of the Black Sea region building with introducing the historical 
context for its establishing. This is followed by an outline of the recent develop-
ments in the Black Sea states, the complexity of international relations, security 
challenges and military balance, thus explaining rationale behind establishing 
BLACKSEAFOR. Then, author characterizes new threats and challenges for 
the Black Sea states and gives an insight into functioning of the BLACKSEAFOR, 
the activities of this organization and how they corresponded to the proclaimed 
goals. The article concludes with present-day trends in the Black Sea region, and 
tries to answer the question, whether BLACKSEAFOR was an effective coopera-
tion platform and what future prospects it might have.
The Black Sea is a region construct, which appeared on the map 
of the world only recently. Its analysis has been rather confined and for 
the most part concentrated on economic cooperation or energy transit. 
However, in terms of security, the region as well poses new threats and 
challenges. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order had specific 
long-lasting implications for the Black Sea region. Formerly, it had been 
an arena for East-West antagonism and an area of the Soviet block domi-
nation. However, after the end of the Cold War, new independent states 
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appeared on the shores of the Black Sea, with different levels of economic 
development, political regime and issues on the agenda of foreign affairs. 
Thus, the dynamics between them changed drastically. Shielded by the Iron 
Curtain before the end of the Cold War, these states for the first time fully 
encountered the processes of globalization and regionalization. 
The Black Sea may be defined as a specific geopolitical entity, uniting 
six littoral states. Furthermore, countries from geographical vicinity (such 
as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova), and those having cultural affiliation 
(Greece) to the region, are trying to become a part of it, constituting the 
‘wider Black Sea region’. In the 1990s, the Black Sea remained a tumultu-
ous region, suffering from wide range of security threats: frozen conflicts, 
diplomatic stand-offs and widespread political instability. It is important to 
see the dynamics of problems, occurring in the Black Sea region through-
out 1990s, to understand, why such organization as BLACKSEAFOR was 
initiated, and what tensions it was intended to overcome.
The hotbeds of tension appeared almost immediately after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union rigid security system. Georgia had been entangled in 
the series of separatist conflicts since the proclamation of independence. 
In 1993, Georgia essentially lost control over Abkhazia region to a com-
bination of Abkhaz, North Caucasian and Russian irregular forces [1]. 
Another challenge on the Georgian territory – the conflict in South Ossetia, 
also with Russian involvement – conceded to a volatile ceasefire in 1992. 
Though the active phase of the conflict was over, the security of the coun-
try was severely endangered, and Georgia faced serious consequences in 
humanitarian sphere [3]. More threats to the regional stability came from 
Russia. The Chechen insurgency destabilized the Northern Caucasus with 
implications for Georgia as well, raising the risks of terrorist attacks, arms 
proliferation and illegal trade. The Chechen war of 1994-1996 threatened 
spillover of military operations, and contributed to extreme volatility in 
the Caucasus region [1].
Apart from the military conflicts, a plethora of bilateral relations in the 
Black Sea region unfolded entanglement of competitive agendas. Russia 
and Turkey – two biggest economies on the Black Sea – were eyeing each 
other as contestants rather than counterparts. Mutual distrust over support 
for ethnic separatists in Chechnya and Kurdistan; Russia’s apprehension 
because of Turkish military cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
which might potentially lead to establishing NATO bases in these countries; 
question of naval balance and establishment of Turkish naval superior-
ity; disagreements on the flank limitations of the CFE treaty after Russia 
violated its regulations in Chechnya; objections of Turkey to the Russia’s 
role as a sole peace-keeper in the CIS and other concerns made relations 
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between these two states rather complicated. Though towards the end 
of 1990s some attempts at political rapprochement were made, essential 
rivalry between Russia and Turkey remained [5].
Relations between Russia and Ukraine were also full of tensions. 
Question of Black Sea fleet division and Russian basing rights in Crimea; 
destabilization of situation in Crimea insinuated from Russia; Russia’s ob-
jections to Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO and other Western partners; 
issues of delimitation and demarcation of the border – all these questions 
made cooperation problematic. Romania and Ukraine had rather cool dip-
lomatic relations due to the fact that Romania refused to recognize border 
between two countries after Ukraine gained independence, and further 
on, disputed the belonging of five islands in the Danube delta and of the 
sea shelf around Serpent Island [5].
At the same time, despite all the differences in envisioning the Black 
Sea region and constructing foreign policy agenda, all the countries en-
countered similar security challenges, typical for the post-September 11 
world – the New Security Threats (NSTs), such as terrorism, illegal arms 
trade and drug trafficking [8]. The presence of NATO in the Black Sea had 
been significant for generating common response to the NSTs and presum-
ably, to the hard security challenges. The Partnership for Peace program 
was aimed at enhancing cooperation with partner states. As a part of PfP 
program, the countries of the Black Sea region have joined in the multi-
national naval peace-keeping trainings exercises ‘Cooperative Partner’. 
Another important naval training program, ‘Sea Breeze’, started out as a 
bilateral Ukraine-USA initiative, but later was enlarged to include 10 more 
other countries, among which also Russia. The Ukrainian-Russian training, 
Peace Fairway, was exclusively bilateral and facilitated battle training and 
peace-keeping operations planning [7]. 
New and old security threats in the Black Sea region showed the ne-
cessity for buildup of common security mechanisms, and overcoming old 
problems in bilateral relations. It was expected, that common military 
collaboration project would diminish distrust over motives and long-term 
political goals of each of the countries and make the relations between the 
states more open and transparent. 
With these considerations in mind, the idea of establishing a multi-
national naval force in the Black Sea region emerged at the meeting of 
Ukrainian and NATO military officials in 1997. It was supported by all the 
littoral states, and finally the formal initiative came from the Turkish Navy 
in 1998. The agreement on establishing Black Sea Naval Force was signed in 
Istanbul on 2 April 2001 by Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and 
Ukraine [4]. BLACKSEAFOR was tasked with search and rescue operations, 
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provision of humanitarian aid in natural disasters, protection of environ-
ment, removal of sea mines, counter-terrorism operations. The command 
rotation was established on six-monthly basis [2]. 
Because the vessels would not always be available due to financial 
restrictions and repair activities, it was agreed to activate the force at least 
once or twice a year during two to four weeks, and hold it in the on-call 
status for the rest of the year. BLACKSEAFOR was not a battle group and 
had no intentions of engaging in the large naval operations. There is no 
political body to coordinate its activities. BALCKSEAFOR was intended to 
accommodate harbor and sea trainings, joint port visits, and become avail-
able for UN And OSCE-mandated peace-support operations. Additionally, 
BLACKSEAFOR opened possibilities for consultations between Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defense of the littoral states [4]. 
The first activation ceremony was held in Golcuk and Istanbul 
on 27-28 September 2001, and the force conducted its first activities 
in September – October 2001 under Turkish command. The second acti-
vation took place in August 2002 under the command of Ukraine [4]. The 
activity of BLACKSEAFOR was continuous and quite successful in a way 
of procuring mutual trust and enhancing cooperation between the navies 
of the six littoral states up until year 2008 [9]. 
The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 had crucial im-
pact on the set of multilateral relations in the region. Careful attempts to 
build-up trustful relations basically failed and BLACKSEAFOR fell apart 
as a platform for dialogue and establishing transparency of military among 
the six littoral states. From that time on, Georgia refused to take part in 
common navy drills with Russia [2].
Though the war had great significance for the whole region, 
BLACKSEAFOR continued to function. Russia and Turkey found common 
ground soon after Georgian war, and it was a decisive step towards orga-
nizing continuation of cooperation in the framework of BLACKSEAFOR. 
Eventually, the navy drills resumed, and in April 2009 all BLACKSEAFOR 
members, excluding Georgia, carried out military exercises. The exercises 
were repeated in 2010 in the same way. In April 2011, to celebrate 10 years 
since BLACKSEAFOR funding, a naval parade was held in Turkey along 
the Bosporus. At this point even Georgia sent its vessel to participate in the 
event. In August 2011 warships from BLACKSEAFOR states carried out 
naval drills, but Georgia again refused to send its ships on this occasion 
(Sanchez, 2012). Thus, the BLACKSEAFOR activities continued to be carried 
out in the constrained framework of small-scale operations, but continued 
to lose its role as a dialogue platform and inclusive organization. 
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The consequences of the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 were also 
significant for the naval balance, as Russia showed trends for increasing 
its military capabilities in the Black Sea basin. The increasing in number 
of submarines from one to seven was planned, as well as construction of 
new naval ships. Also, the strategic aircraft, including TU-23M3 bombers, 
was to be returned to the Black Sea Fleet. The size and number of weapons 
deployed on the territory of Ukraine was augmented, and the back-up base 
in Novorossiysk developed. In 2005, the Russian government approved a 
federal program of developing the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of the 
Russian Federation from 2005-2020. The estimated cost of this program 
is over 3 billion dollars. In 2010, the Russian government spent nearly 90 
million dollars to set up the base in Novorossiysk, and funding for 2012 is 
estimated at 300 million dollars [6]. 
The rise of Russian interest in the Black Sea region and increasing the 
military potential has coincided with growing tensions in the Middle 
East. The situation in Syria and Iran diverted Turkey’s attention from the 
northern vector of policy, and took away NATO’s focus from the Black 
Sea region. Consequently, there was no regional power able to challenge 
Russian dominance in the area, and the global actors became less actively 
involved, even after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and worrying trends 
of military build-up, attempted by Russia. In this way, initiatives of military 
cooperation and dialogue, such as BLACKSEAFOR, became negligible. The 
Russian policy after 2008 generally contributed to the falling apart of the 
already weak regional cooperation. The recent developments in Ukraine 
affirm this trend, and put the sole existence of BLACKSEAFOR in its pres-
ent format under doubt, as Ukrainian government started negotiating 
exclusion of Russia from this organization [10]. Until present moment, the 
functionality of the organization is frozen. 
Conclusions
BLACKSEAFOR is a unique construct of regional cooperation, because 
it is focusing solely on military forces without political coordination and 
engagement. It was created as a good-will initiative, to promote openness 
and dialogue among the Black Sea littoral states, without aiming at ever 
becoming a full-fledged military alliance. But not only complex structure 
of regional geopolitics prevented BLACKSEAFOR from turning into a 
real security power. Black Sea as a region was never a top priority for any 
of the littoral states: Turkey was being involved in the Middle East and 
Central Asia, reassessing its role in the post-bipolar world; post-socialist 
countries tried to overcome economic crisis and political instability, focus-
ing on the integration with NATO and the EU. Russia tried to cope with 
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its internal problems and returned to claiming supremacy in the region 
only recently. 
Since the end of the 1990s NATO, actively present in the security coop-
eration on the Black Sea before, started to relay the main responsibility for 
assuring stability on its partners (mainly, Turkey). BLACKSEAFOR was 
initiated as a way for the littoral states to open up to each other, increase 
credibility and fight together with new challenges and new security threats. 
The type of cooperation within BLACKSEAFOR was rather confined and 
limited to humanitarian and search-and-rescue tasks. But that was the rea-
son why organization started to function right after the agreement was 
signed, and managed to do so successfully until the August war of 2008, 
as the countries did not have to make political concessions. 
Taking this functionalist approach, increasing cooperation of navy 
should have spilled-over to other fields of collaboration, and create 
a common ground for region-building. But it did not happen, due to the 
variety of reasons, the most important of which is that the littoral states 
and their vision of foreign policy differed greatly. Though, drastic changes 
the world went through since the 1990s have to be taken into account. 
BLACKSEAFOR was envisaged and started to function in the uni-polar 
world of unquestionable dominance of the USA. The Black Sea was just 
one of many regions in the world, where two regional powers (Turkey and 
Russia), approximately equal in terms of military and economy potential, 
outbalanced each other and strived for preserving status-quo. But since 
that time, major changes happened to the Black Sea states. Russia started 
to gain more economic weight with the rise of prices for oil and gas, which 
allowed it to pursue new objectives in foreign policy – dominance in the 
area of former Soviet Union, and primarily in the Black Sea region. Turkey’s 
focus shifted from Europe and the Black Sea more to the Middle East, 
pursuing its own national interests, rather than complying with the status 
of a loyal NATO ally. NATO’s presence in the Black Sea became far less 
unquestionable and far more often accepted by Turkey only reluctantly. 
The smaller states, in terms of both economy and military capacity, such 
as Ukraine and Georgia, naturally looked for an umbrella power, which 
would help them survive the growing distortion of regional geopolitical 
balance. And that power was USA and NATO, which were starting to 
lose their capacity to influence developments in the Black Sea, but more 
importantly – losing interest to do so. Additionally, Bulgaria and Romania 
remained rather passive in all the processes of region-building in the Black 
Sea. Neither able to significantly influence proceedings, nor being chal-
lenged by the changes in the region, they did not express special interest 
in the Black Sea regional organizations. 
29
Актуальні проблеми політики. 2015. Вип. 55
BLACKSEAFOR functioning was in many ways linked to the preser-
vation of the status-quo which existed in the beginnings of the 2000s. But 
when it changed, and the balance in the region was distorted, the existence 
of common military structure is hardly possible. Finally, the major task of 
BLACKSEAFOR as an organization was to promote dialogue, and it man-
aged to do so while dialogue was in the interest of key regional powers. 
Regarding current changes in the region, it is doubtful that transparent 
communication is possible or even desirable. Unfortunately, the recent 
developments show that the Black Sea region is returning to its former 
stance as an arena for geopolitical stand-off. 
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Стаття присвячена дослідженню досвіду співробітництва в галузі 
безпеки в Чорному морі в рамках організації Блексіфор. Автор аналізує 
особливості виникнення Чорноморського регіону, досліджуючи складності 
міжнародних відносин, проблем безпеки та військового балансу, щоби при-
вести обґрунтування виникнення Блексіфор. Далі автор характеризує нові 
загрози і виклики для країн Чорного моря і дає уявлення про функціону-
вання Блексіфор. Стаття завершується переглядом сучасних тенденцій 
в Чорноморському регіоні і спробою відповісти на питання, чи був Блексіфор 
ефективною платформою співпраці і які майбутні перспективи він може 
мати.
Статья посвящена исследованию опыта сотрудничества в сфере безопас-
ности в Черном море в рамках организации Блэксифор. Автор анализирует 
особенности возникновения Черноморского региона, исследуя сложности 
международных отношений, проблем безопасности и военного баланса, чтобы 
привести обоснования возникновения Блэксифор. Далее автор характери-
зует новые угрозы и вызовы для стран Черного моря и дает представление 
о функционировании Блэксифор. Статья завершается обзором современных 
тенденций в Черноморском регионе и попыткой ответить на вопрос, был 
ли Блэксифор эффективной платформой сотрудничества и какие будущие 
перспективы он может иметь.
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